Iran’s War Plan Gets Desperate

Iran’s opening missile strike strategy in a future conflict reveals a calculated plan to overwhelm American forces in the Gulf through massive short-range salvos, exploiting lessons learned from the 2025 Israel-Iran “12-Day War” while its depleted arsenal races against time.

Story Snapshot

Iran plans to prioritize short-range ballistic missiles for rapid saturation strikes on U.S. Gulf bases like Al Udeid rather than medium-range systems
The regime’s missile stockpile has plummeted from 2,500 to roughly 1,000-1,200 after Israeli strikes crippled production facilities and the 2025 conflict depleted reserves
Strategic analysis shows Iran cannot neutralize American airpower but aims to disrupt operations by cratering runways and infrastructure in opening salvos
Tehran pursues supersonic anti-ship missiles from China and air defenses from Russia to offset conventional military disadvantages

Iran’s Strategic Missile Math Favors Gulf Saturation

Iranian military planners developed their opening strike strategy around a critical calculation: short-range ballistic missiles enable sustained, high-tempo attacks on nearby Gulf targets that medium-range systems cannot match. Strategic analysis from defense experts shows the regime would concentrate SRBMs against American bases across the Persian Gulf, particularly Al Udeid in Qatar, where rapid launches with minimal warning could crater runways and delay U.S. air operations. This approach reflects hard lessons from the June 2025 “12-Day War” with Israel, which exposed vulnerabilities in Iran’s launcher infrastructure and revealed the unsustainable attrition rates of medium-range missiles during extended conflict.

Depleted Arsenal Forces Rapid-Fire Opening Gambit

Iran’s missile inventory constraints directly shape its first-strike calculus, with current stockpiles estimated at 1,000-1,200 missiles after Israeli airstrikes destroyed 12-20 solid-fuel production mixers in October 2024. The regime’s advanced medium-range systems like Sejjil, Kheibar Shekan, and Fattah-1 remain sidelined by paralyzed production capacity, forcing reliance on older liquid-fuel missiles and short-range systems. Dr. Andrew Latham’s analysis concludes this inventory depletion pressures Tehran to fire massive volumes early in any conflict, betting on shock value before counterstrikes eliminate remaining launchers. The strategic math favors opening salvos that trade finite stockpiles for maximum disruption, accepting that Iran cannot sustain prolonged missile campaigns against adversaries with superior air defenses and strike capabilities.

Accuracy Limitations Shape Target Selection

Iranian missile accuracy fundamentally constrains targeting strategy, with systems like the Khorramshahr medium-range missile achieving only 30-meter circular error probable that suits area damage rather than precision strikes. This technical reality pushes Iranian planners toward infrastructure targets where near-misses still inflict operational delays, particularly airfield complexes where cratered runways ground aircraft regardless of pinpoint accuracy. Defense analysts note medium-range missiles would be reserved for high-value deterrence targets including Israeli military installations and critical Gulf energy infrastructure, while shorter-range systems handle volume-dependent saturation missions. The regime’s underground “missile cities” continue expanding production despite Israeli damage, but replacement rates cannot match combat consumption, reinforcing the opening-salvo strategy that accepts inventory exhaustion for immediate tactical gains.

China and Russia Enablement Shifts Regional Balance

Tehran’s pursuit of advanced Chinese and Russian weapons systems represents a critical force multiplier for its missile-centric strategy, with the CM-302 supersonic anti-ship missile deal nearing completion as of February 2026. Israeli defense expert Danny Citrinowicz characterizes the 290-kilometer-range CM-302 as a “game-changer” against U.S. naval forces due to its extreme difficulty to intercept, directly threatening American carrier strike groups that would respond to Iranian aggression. Simultaneously, Iran has solicited air defense systems from Moscow and Beijing to protect launch sites and production facilities from the counterstrikes that decimated its capabilities in 2025. This arms acquisition strategy reflects Iranian recognition that without external technological infusions, its indigenous missile program cannot overcome the conventional military advantages held by the United States and Israel, particularly in airpower dominance.

Nuclear Ambiguity Amplifies Deterrence Stakes

Many Iranian medium-range missiles maintain nuclear capability, including the Shahab-3 with 1,300-kilometer range and Ghadr-1 reaching 2,000 kilometers, introducing catastrophic escalation risks into any missile exchange scenario. Council on Foreign Relations weapons experts assess that urban warheads from these systems could kill hundreds of civilians, dramatically raising stakes beyond military targeting. President Trump warned February 25 that Iran continues pursuing missiles capable of striking the United States, though U.S. intelligence projects such intercontinental capability remains over a decade away with potential deployment of 60 ICBMs by 2035. This nuclear ambiguity serves Tehran’s asymmetric deterrence strategy against adversaries with overwhelming conventional superiority, though the Trump administration’s maximum pressure approach and intelligence-driven sanctions target production bottlenecks. Patriots should recognize that Iran’s regime willingly embraces regional instability and mass casualty risks to preserve its grip on power, threatening American service members, allies, and the constitutional mandate to provide common defense against such rogue actors.